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The paper shows how entrepreneurial taxes interact with the career choice of individuals, the 
quality of entrepreneurs, and their effort and investments. It is particularly relevant to 
differentiate the early effects on start-up enterprises with substantial uncertainty from the tax 
effects on mature firms where the uncertainty is resolved. That is why the neutrality results of 
dividend taxation from mature company theory do not carry over to start-up enterprises. The 
Nordic dual model encourages (discourages) the establishment of new enterprises by 
entrepreneurs who anticipate high (low) profitability. 
JEL Code: H25. 





University of Helsinki 
Department of Economics 
P.O. Box 17 









University of Tampere 
Department of Economics and Accounting 





November 8, 2005. 
This paper has matured and expanded from a start-up version, with the results of the initial 
effort presented at the Third Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics, CESifo, 
Munich, June 20-21, 2003. The authors are grateful to Sören Bo Nielsen and other conference 
participants for their useful comments on those early versions. Vesa Kanniainen gratefully 
acknowledges the financial support of the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation and Jouko Ylä-
Liedenpohja that of the Nordic Tax Research Council. 1 Introduction
In the early 1990s Finland, Sweden and Norway implemented ambitious reforms
of personal and corporate income taxation. By adopting so-called dual income
taxation, hereafter DIT, they gave up the principle of global income taxation
that had long guided the evolution of their income tax systems. In global income
taxation, all economic income is subject to a single progressive tax schedule. The
Nordic innovation was to divide personal income into capital income and earned
income, say labor income, pensions and social bene￿ts. Only earned income is
taxed at a progressive schedule while income from capital is taxed at a ￿ at rate.
This is the fundamental idea of DIT.
Therefore, in DIT dividends and realized capital gains from widely-held (e.g.
listed) companies are always treated as income from capital. But, income from
closely-held companies and unincorporated businesses (sole proprietors) is split
into income from capital and earned income. Prior to such a personal tax, pro￿ts
from incorporated and unincorporated businesses are taxed at a ￿ at rate, which
is typically the same as the capital income tax rate. The split rule de￿nes the
maximum that is capital income for tax purposes, using a presumptive rate of
return either on the gross or net assets of the enterprise.
The explicit goals of those reforms were to improve savings incentives, al-
leviate the problems arising from taxing in￿ ationary gains, limit opportunities
for tax arbitrage and reduce the distortion caused by the non-uniform treat-
ment of di⁄erent kinds of income from capital in the old system (Nielsen and
Słrensen 1997). In a word, the tax reforms were designed to produce signi￿cant
e¢ ciency gains. Tikka (1993) and Cnossen (2000) also see DIT as a small coun-
try response to increasing international capital mobility. The idea of DIT was
￿rst developed and implemented in Denmark (Słrensen 1988), but the bene￿ts
of a separate proportional tax on all types of capital income were also recog-
nized outside the Nordic countries1; cf. King (1987). Theoretical support for
this tax system is provided by the Johansson-Samuelson theorem, explicated by
Sinn (1987), saying that a uniform tax on all capital income, net of true eco-
nomic depreciation, is neutral in respect of investment decisions. Subsequently,
Słrensen (1994) suggested that DIT may cause fewer distortions than conven-
tional income tax. Nielsen and Słrensen (1997) argued that the latter has a
distortionary bias against investment in non-human capital, which can be o⁄set
by DIT.2
The current paper develops a relevant framework for a start-up enterprise
run by an owner-manager. Entrepreneurs adopt the role of risk-taking by estab-
lishing and running their own enterprises, providing e⁄ort and private money
to undertake investment decisions. The life-cycle of an enterprise has both a
1Subsequently, Italy also adopted a DIT system with some similar, though not quite iden-
tical features as in the Nordic DIT.
2DIT with its split rules may be arousing wider policy appeal as re￿ected by the recent
DICE Report of CESifo (DICE 2004). In the German popular debate, DIT is seen as a
practical solution to tax competion from economies in transition, in particular, with the
German Council of Economic Experts (2003) proposing it for Germany.
2start-up phase and an expansion phase. Unsuccessful ideas are wiped out. Only
successful ideas can lead to a mature corporation, allowing the entrepreneur to
cash pro￿t. While earlier studies have produced models which abstract from
business risks, we introduce entrepreneurial risk. We argue that the Domar-
Musgrave result of the insurance function of income taxation does not apply
in the case of start-up enterprises. The government does not share losses from
the start-up phase and no insurance is available for the genuine business risk
because of moral hazard.
Our analysis is carried out in a framework where the wage rate and mar-
ket interest rate are given. These assumptions are consistent with the idea of
enterprises being hosted by a small open economy with the wage rate being
determined on the basis of productivity in the tradeable sector and with the
residence principle applied for the taxation of worldwide interest income. The
start-up ￿rm is assumed to be domestically owned. Therefore the domestic
taxes on its dividends and capital gains remain relevant.
DIT is designed to eliminate excessive taxation of entrepreneurial income
due to progressivity, but this has a striking implication. The pro￿tability dis-
tribution of enterprises becomes important. Entrepreneurs expecting positive
pro￿tability, but lower than the presumptive rate, may face a higher tax rate in
the dual tax system than without it. Entrepreneurs expecting high pro￿tabil-
ity face high marginal tax rates on earned income, though the split approach
reduces their average tax rate. For this group of entrepreneurs, the dual tax cre-
ates an incentive to transform entrepreneurial income into more leniently taxed
capital income. To prevent that, the split rule is needed.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. We show that it is particularly relevant to
di⁄erentiate the early tax e⁄ects on start-up enterprises with substantial uncer-
tainty from the tax e⁄ects on mature ￿rms where the uncertainty is resolved.
Our analysis of Nordic DIT reveals di⁄erences between the Nordic countries,
showing also that the neutrality results of dividend taxation from the tax the-
ory of mature companies do not carry over to start-up enterprises. For an
incorporated enterprise, we ￿nd that the entrepreneur￿ s ability threshold rises
with the tax rate when there is a tax structure with uniform tax rates. In
particular, Nordic DIT encourages (discourages) the establishment of a new en-
terprise by an entrepreneur who expects high (low) pro￿tability. The incentive
e⁄ects on enterprise formation of DIT among the two types are thus opposite.
The low types face a higher cost of capital for start-up and expansion invest-
ments and a higher tax cost of e⁄ort provision than without DIT and its split
rule. But, depending on the details of the split rule, for high-pro￿tability en-
terprises the DIT rules may give a boost to expansion investment and mitigate
the penalty on start-up investment caused by taxing dividends as earned in-
come. The size of the boost to expansion investment depends on what view one
takes the undervaluation of undistributed pro￿ts (business assets) at the time
when the entrepreneur exits his enterprise, being of course the strongest with no
undervaluation. But undervaluation may have most detrimental e⁄ects on the
incentives of sole proprietors. Instead, the start-up investment is not a⁄ected
by undervaluation, but our model enables us to derive an explicit expression for
3Sinn￿ s (1991a,b) problem of how the initial cost of capital exceeds the classical
one predicted by double taxation of dividends, when a realization-based capital
gains tax is also applied.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review
and section 3 presents the component of the model without taxation. Section
4 introduces the Nordic DIT rules, ￿rst for the taxation of sole proprietors and
thereafter for the taxation of incorporated enterprises. Section 5 analyzes the
career choice between an entrepreneur and a laborer. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature: A Review
Enterprise Taxation Models of the interaction of taxation and capital for-
mation have traditionally analyzed publicly traded mature companies. In this
framework, the cost of capital for investments has centered on the issue of
whether double taxation of dividends matters for marginal investments (the
old view) or whether it is that of retained earnings (the new or trapped equity
view), the dividend tax falling upon inframarginal investments.3 Therefore, such
models have distanced themselves from the pertinent entrepreneurial issues and
fully lack relevant links to the intrinsic characteristics of a start-up enterprise.
There are few models that focus on enterprise formation. Kanbur (1979),
one of the ￿rst to introduce a model of entrepreneurship and occupational
choice, argued that progressive taxation tends to encourage entrepreneurs to
enter the market if their risk aversion is high. The result derives from the
Domar-Musgrave property of ideal progressive income taxation that it shares
in the risks of entrepreneurial activities. One should, however, note that entre-
preneurs working on a single project cannot bene￿t from loss o⁄set provisions
to the same extent as companies, consisting of several uncorrelated projects.
Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001) introduced di⁄erential social insurance of
labor and entrepreneurial income in a welfare state, establishing its detrimental
impact on enterprise formation.
In his analysis of the birth and death of ￿rms, King (1989) assumed that
the implementation of an innovation, a business idea, requires a corporate form.
Therefore an entrepreneur must either sell equity claims to outside suppliers of
￿nance or sell his business idea to an existing mature company. The corporate
form entails an additional tax beyond the sole proprietor. But then the tax is
capitalized in the market price of the issue of equity, trapped in the corporate
form. The alternative of dealing with a mature company results in an implicit
tax caused by the cost of bureaucracy. If such costs are higher (smaller) than
the degree of undervaluation of the corporate form equity, business ideas are
embodied, if at all, in new companies (implemented in existing ￿rms). The
larger the additional tax on companies, the smaller the fraction of business
ideas that lead to the birth of new companies. Deaths of companies occur
3The two views are summarized by Auerbach (1983). The "new view" was developed by
King (1974, 1977), Bergst￿m and S￿dersten (1977), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981).
4through takeovers in King (1989). Due to undervaluation, the acquired assets
are cheaper, but also entail higher adjustment costs than new investment goods.
A dividend tax induced enterprise growth was analyzed by Sinn (1991a, b).
He showed that with a dividend tax the initial cost of capital for external equity
is higher than the old view suggests. That is why the ￿rm underinvests in
respect of its long-run stock of capital. More importantly, the ￿rm thereafter
enters a purely internally ￿nanced growth phase, during which no dividends are
paid and no new shares are issued. Having reached its long-run optimal stock
of capital, the new view applies. Building on Keuschnigg (2001), Dietz (2003)
extended the Sinn framework in a general equilibrium framework.
The trapped equity models contain two di⁄erent reasons for equity underval-
uation in equilibrium. The King-Auerbach-Bradford undervaluation of mature
companies is due to the capitalization of the owners￿future dividend taxes over
their capital gains taxes into the current share price. Instead, the King (1989)
long-run undervaluation arises from the capitalization of the underlying corpo-
ration taxes on future dividends and is therefore independent of the owners￿tax
rates.4 The discrepancy between the two arises from the fact that the former
is based on a partial equilibrium insight while the latter builds upon a gen-
eral equilibrium analysis of Auerbach and King (1983)5 and explicitly models
acquisitions as an alternative strategy to new investments.
Some studies have addressed the optimal taxation of enterprises under asym-
metric information (Moresi 1998). Such papers show that the cost of market
entry and entrepreneurial e⁄orts are important mechanisms which are absent
from company tax models.6
Dual Income Taxation There are a few studies on the behavior of enter-
prises under DIT. Hagen and Słrensen (1998) discussed at length the division of
income from small businesses. Kari (1999) argued that, depending on how the
ceiling of imputed capital income is determined, the Finnish dual income tax
may lead to a strong investment incentive for closely held companies. Lindhe et
al. (2002, 2004) showed that the Swedish splitting scheme, which is based on the
acquisition value of capital assets (company shares), is neutral in its treatment
of investments by a closely-held company (CHC) ￿nanced by retained earnings
in respect of those by a widely-held one. Investments by a CHC ￿nanced by new
share issues may, however, be a⁄ected by the Swedish splitting scheme. Lindhe
et al. (2002) argued about the old Finnish scheme similarly to Kari (1999).
The Norwegian scheme was found to be distortive, though the direction of the
incentives was ambiguous. Norway and Finland di⁄er from Sweden in that in
4The precise de￿nition of the degree of undervaluation is "the ratio of the maximum net
dividend which could be paid after the combined weight of corporate and personal taxation
to the maximum net dividend which could be paid if there were no separate corporate tax
system", the ACID Test Statistic in King (1977, 80).
5King (1986) contains the necessary details.
6There are also mechanisms which tend to limit the actual tax liability of entrepreneurs.
Gordon (1998) has argued that entrepreneurs have access to methods of transforming labor
income into capital income. For a comprehensive treatment, see Parker (2004).
5the former two the split is based on the current value of assets. Alstadsaeter
(2003) considered the Norwegian case, suggesting that it provides entrepreneurs
with great incentives to participate in tax-minimizing income shifting. She also
concluded that the Norwegian dual income tax leads to overinvestment and
that the corporate organizational form serves as a tax shelter for high-income
entrepreneurs.
Moreover, both Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2002) found that the split
system substantially raises the cost of capital for initial investments ￿nanced by
outside equity because the resulting residual dividends are taxed as earned in-
come. Lindhe et al. (2002) simulated such an initial cost of capital to be three to
￿ve times the steady-state one. Hagen and Słrensen (1998), Panteghini (2001)
and Słrensen (2003) address the important issue of whether the presumptive
rate of return should, in addition to a default-free rate of interest, include a risk
premium. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) report that the choice of the type of payout
from CHCs to their owners is strongly, but not uniquely, motivated by taxes.
3 Model of an Entrepreneur
In contrast to publicly traded mature companies, unincorporated enterprises
and closely-held corporations with a dominant owner operate in a di⁄erent stage
of the life-cycle of the ￿rm. In a sense, an owner-managed enterprise can be
viewed as a premature prototype of the former and may never become a mature
company. Indeed, empirical ￿gures indicate that about half of new start-ups
default or vanish within the ￿rst ￿ve years of their life-cycle (Geroski (1995)).
This means that the economics of an owner-managed enterprise also is di⁄er-
ent from that of a mature corporation with diversi￿ed share ownership and a
management team working on an incentive scheme. Limited ability to bear and
share risks and typically unlimited liability restrict market entry of individuals
who have to face substantial uncertainty in the early stage of the project, before
uncertainty recedes.7 This is di⁄erent from an enterprise in the expansion phase
with a proven track record of success that can rely on outside capital markets to
￿nance its expansion investment, business risks being undertaken by diversi￿ed
ownership. Because the theory of an enterprise with a start-up phase cannot
be copied from the theory of a mature corporation, this section develops the
pertinent tools of an entrepreneurial model.
Entrepreneurial qualities Potential entrepreneurs possess a project idea.
Some are more productive and innovative than others. There is a continuum of
entrepreneurs, indexed by ability a 2 (0;a). There are three stages, indexed by
time, t = 0;1;2: In stage t = 0 individuals face a career choice between forming
an enterprise and entering the labor market: The allocation of individuals to
7When the project is fully ￿nanced from outside sources in conditions of asymmetric infor-
mation, the problem is di⁄erent. Low-quality projects get subsidized by high-quality projects
(de Meza and Webb (1999)). As they do not havea reputation or outside assets to pledge,
outside ￿nanciers face a lemon￿ s problem, distorting the early cost of capital.
6risky industries occurs by self-selection. Commitment to entrepreneurship re-
quires an initial e⁄ort, e > 0; and an initial investment, k > 0; at time t = 0:
E⁄ort represents a non-replicable input, like sweat capital.8 The e⁄ort cost is
convex, c(e) = 1
2e2. The ￿rst production stage provides entrepreneurs with a
signal, ￿; of the pro￿tability of their idea. Investment in a ￿rst-stage project
thus provides a risky return af(e;k;￿i)+k: Entrepreneurs do not know ex ante
the true pro￿tability ￿ of their project, only its distribution. The signal can
take three values, ￿o < ￿L < ￿H. With the probabilities ￿L;￿H; the project
will be a success, the initial investment being recovered and an operating pro￿t
made with af(e;k;￿H) > af(e;k;￿L) > 0. We assume f to be jointly concave
in e and k. Success the occurs with the probability ￿L+￿H < 1. Failure occurs
with the probability 1 ￿ ￿￿i; when the project is of the type ￿ = ￿o; returning




Enterprises with a bad signal leave the market. Those with a good signal
have the option to allocate the ￿rst-stage cash ￿ ow to an immediate dividend,
d; or to expansion investment K > 0 at time t = 1. To highlight the idea that
risks are greatest at the early stage of a project, we assume that the second-
stage return is not subject to uncertainty. The enterprise is assumed to be sold
at its net asset value at time t = 2:
To emphasize the fundamental di⁄erences between start-up enterprises and
mature companies, we introduce di⁄erent technologies in the two stages, af(e;k;￿i);
F(K;￿i); with access to the second obtainable stochastically.9 The second-stage
technology can be viewed as an advanced version of the ￿rst-stage technology,
formally expressed as F(a;x;￿i) = af(0;x;￿i): It does not require specialized
inputs. Hence, no e⁄ort is needed and the return is given by F(a;K;￿i) which,
given ￿, is increasing and strictly concave in a and K: To economize in no-
tation, we work in the following with F(K;￿), surpressing a. The second-
stage return is thought to be greater for an H-￿rm than for an L-￿rm, i.e.
F(K;￿H) > F(K;￿L). In the second stage, a successful entrepreneur also has
access to private bene￿ts, bK; related to the amount invested, b > 0.10 Note,
however, that private bene￿ts in later stages do not represent a free lunch for
surviving entrepreneurs who had to undertake costly e⁄orts in the earlier stage.
We assume that the ￿rst-stage capital k depreciates fully and that the de-
preciation charges of the second-stage capital K are fully reinvested. This dis-
tinction also highlights the heterogeneity of capital over the life-cycle of the
enterprise. In the second production stage the successful enterprise accumu-
lates net assets, ￿V = F(K;￿i) + K ￿ k: The ￿rm is sold in a trade sale or it
goes public through an initial public o⁄ering (IPO), allowing the entrepreneur
to exit. The time line of our three-stage model is given in Figure 1.
8In this respect, our model o⁄ers a broader view of the birth of enterprises than King
(1989).
9Intuitively, as the start-up technology is a prototype of the mature company, the di⁄erence
arises from learning and business experience. To survive successfully into an expansion stage,
it is also necessary for the entrepreneur to develop a proper organizational set-up for his
business, a well functioning entrepreneurial or corporate culture.
10This mechanism has been well known in the liteture on corporate ￿nance since Jensen
and Meckling (1976).
7Figure 1: Time Line of the Model
The value of an entrepreneurial career Assume risk neutrality and let V
denote the value of an entrepreneurial career in a risky industry. The cash ￿ ows
in periods 1 and 2 are
d = af(e;k;￿) + k ￿ K; D = F(K;￿) + K: (1)
Let r = the interest rate. Only the ￿rst-stage cash ￿ ow d is subject to
uncertainty. The second-stage cash ￿ ow D; the liquidation of the project, is
conditional on success in the initial stage, but deterministic for any successful
project. In terms of backward induction, the project value at the beginning of
the second stage is




Then, the optimal risky career satis￿es
V ￿
0 (a;￿) = max
e;k
￿
￿(c(e) + k) + ￿i￿i 1
1 + r





1 (￿) = maxK V1(K;￿); provided that the participation constraint (7)
below is satis￿ed:
It becomes important to analyze separately the costs of capital for the ￿rst-
stage (initial investment) and for the second-stage (expansion investment). The
optimal expansion investment of surviving enterprises satis￿es
FK(K;￿i) = r ￿ b; i = H;L: (4)
Thus private bene￿ts reduce the second-stage cost of capital because they oper-
ate as perfect substitutes for cash dividends.11 Recall, however, that this e⁄ect
is relevant only for successful enterprises.
11Their role is important as they are unobservable and represent an untaxed source of
entrepreneurial income.






(1 + r ￿ ￿i￿i): (5)
The probability of success ￿￿i raises the expected return (left-hand side)
and reduces the cost of capital (right-hand side). The latter is the skill-scaled
asset cost, 1=a; multiplied by the full opportunity cost of funds employed, or cost
of depreciation and interest adjusted for the success probability. Consequently,
the risk of failure raises the initial cost of capital, high failure risk (1 ￿ ￿￿i)
discouraging early investment. More able entrepreneurs invest more. Moreover,
note that when the two conditions (4) and (5) hold with equality, they describe
an interior solution for optimal dividend along the growth path. 12
With c(e) = 1





[1 + r]: (6)
The left-hand side represents the marginal expected return on e⁄ort. The right-
hand side is the forward value of the skill-scaled marginal cost of e⁄ort. A high
￿rst-stage cost of capital also reduces entrepreneurial e⁄ort.
The entry threshold in terms of the marginal entrepreneurial am ability is
a⁄ected by taxes. Entrepreneurs do not know the true type of their project,
￿; only its distribution. They compare various candidate projects using the
discount rate, r; to provide a ranking. Those who enter as entrepreneurs evaluate
the expected value of their career, V , and compare it to the life-time value of
an outside option, w: This can be viewed as labor income, insured by social
insurance. Then, the entry threshold is given by
V ￿
0 (a) ￿ w: (7)
Evaluating, @V ￿
0 (a)=@a = ￿
1+rf(b e;b k;￿) > 0 holds because by the envelope
theorem we need to consider only the direct e⁄ect of a parameter change on
the optimized function (3). The project value is proportionately increasing in
entrepreneurial ability. The most able agents become entrepreneurs, given that
the outside option is unrelated to the entrepreneurial skill. For the marginal
entrepreneur with ability am, V ￿
0 (am) = w holds:
This completes our basic framework.
4 Taxation of Enterprises
4.1 Sole Proprietor
The sole proprietor is only taxed on pro￿ts at the rate on earned income, ￿w:
The business is assumed to be sold at the book value of assets at the end of
12We can also have a corner solution with all cash ￿ow invested and no dividends paid
out if the second-stage investment is expected to be highly pro￿table with FK( b K) > r ￿ b.
Excluding the possibility of a negative dividend (share issue), the cost of capital does not
determine the amount invested. In this paper, we do not analyze corner solutions in depth.
9the second stage. Therefore, no additional taxable income will be generated.13
Denoting the tax rate on interest income by ￿p; the net rate of interest is given







(1 + r)2: (8)
The sole proprietor maximizes
V ￿ (￿) = max
e;k;K
[Vo(e;k;K;a;￿i) ￿ ￿i￿iT(e;k;K;a;￿i)]
where Vo (￿) is given by condition (3). The ￿rst-order conditions of the optimiza-
tion problem reduce to the following conditions for the second- and ￿rst-stage





















which, as a matter of fact, are the benchmark values of a Johansson-Samuelson
(JS) tax, taxing all income comprehensively once, including interest income,
i.e. ￿w = ￿p. The JS tax is generally regarded to be neutral in respect of the
project choice.14 But in this model it clearly is not neutral in respect of the




because such a loss is not deductible from taxable income, in contrast to the
Domar-Musgrave (1944) case. Because the ￿rm can fail in the initial stage, the
tax-adjusted return which the entrepreneur must earn is 1=(1 ￿ ￿w) > 1 times
the expected unrecoverable initial stake.
Lastly, the founding entrepreneur recognizes the potential undervaluation of
the business assets, brought about by the tax system, when he comes to sell
them at date t = 2. Let ￿ stand for the sale price of the sold assets in respect
of their book value. It means that with ￿ ￿ 1 he cashes an amount
1
(1 + r)2(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿w)F(K;￿) + K]









13We assume no goodwill gains at the instant of realization, which is equivalent to assuming
that the subsequent future cash ￿ows satisfy the rate of return requirement but do not create
additional value.
14Under such an income tax with economic depreciation, the tax rate-invariant valuation
of investment projects holds (cf. Sinn 1987, 119, King 1977, 117), though the intertemporal
distortion of saving and investment decisions remains.
10If the rate of undervaluation 1￿￿ = ￿c is due to corporation tax at the rate ￿c,
as in King (1989), we see that unincorporated enterprises are subject to double
taxation in their expansion phase via two venues, the tax multiplier and a tax
system caused capital loss, and therefore face a higher cost of capital than the
"new view" suggests for mature companies. A sole proprietor cannot escape the
e⁄ect of double taxation if he is forced to sell his assets as a going concern to
the corporate sector.
4.1.1 Nordic split rules
Nordic DIT splits the entrepreneur￿ s total business income into income from
capital and earned income using the concept of a capital base, B. This consists
of the entrepreneur￿ s initial investment and the subsequently reinvested busi-
ness income, net of taxes. The accounting rules and tax laws vary among the
Nordic countries, but the fundamental idea of the split is ￿ltered by a somewhat
simpli￿ed version, as follows. Denoting the tax liabilities by T1;T2; the capital
bases at the end of the ￿rst and second stages are de￿ned
B1 = af(e;k;￿) + k ￿ T1; B2 = F(K;￿) + K ￿ T2: (13)
The tax authorities impute the amount of capital income by a presumptive rate
of return, say ￿, and tax them, ￿B1 and ￿B2, at the ￿ at rate on capital income,
￿p. Any remaining business pro￿ts are taxed at the rate of earned income, ￿i
w.
This is the tax rate determined by the realized total business income in the
respective income band i on the progressive rate schedule, but we assume it to
take only two values ￿L
w < ￿p < ￿H
w :
Thus, we obtain the entrepreneur￿ s ￿rst- and second-stage tax liabilities
T1 = ￿p￿B1 + ￿i
w[af(e;k;￿) ￿ ￿B1]
T2 = ￿p￿B2 + ￿i
w[F(K;￿) ￿ ￿B2]:
Inserting B1 and B2 from (13), we solve for
T1 =


























w￿￿p) ; is the sole









The ￿rst-order condition for the optimal expansion-stage investment is
FK(K;￿i) =
￿








; i = H;L
and is clearly a⁄ected by the DIT split rule. There is an additional cost of
capital e⁄ect which depends upon the split parameter ￿ and the realized prof-
itability which determines the tax rate di⁄erential ￿i
w ￿ ￿p: Uncertainty about
the pro￿tability of the project, ￿; is revealed before the expansion investment.
In contrast to (9) of a JS tax, the split rule15 o⁄ers an enormous incentive
for expansion-stage investment if realized total business income settles in the
income band of a progressive tax rate schedule where the entrepreneur faces a
tax rate ￿H
w > ￿p. But, if the business generates relatively little total income so
that ￿L
w < ￿p holds in that income band, we observe that the split relief of the
DIT alters into an additional tax on the entrepreneur￿ s expansion-stage capital,
leading to a higher cost of capital than without the DIT.
























We recall that the JS tax magni￿es the risk of failure, ￿(1 ￿ ￿i), e⁄ect on
the cost of capital for a start-up entrepreneur. If ￿H > ￿L is expected, the
DIT split reduces the initial cost of capital not only directly, but also indirectly
by moderating the risk of failure e⁄ect, because an entrepreneur expecting high
pro￿tability faces ￿H
w ￿￿p > 0: A striking implication is that in the case ￿H < ￿L
the DIT split via the two mechanisms now turns into an additional tax on start-





w > 0: These conclusions follow from the fact
that the fraction of taxable capital income is separated ￿rst when taxing sole
proprietors.


















the split rule moderates the marginal cost of e⁄ort when ￿H > ￿L and ￿H
w ￿￿p >
0 hold. In the opposite case; the DIT split system additionally penalizes the tax
cost of e⁄ort. So we have proved the following.
15The imputed rate of return on assets, ￿; is not the same in every Nordic country, and is
potentially highest in Finland. In the Finnish case dividends from a non-listed company are
capital income if they do not exceed a 9 per cent return on the (net of debt) asset value of the
distributing company. An unincorporated entrepreneur can elect to set the presumptive rate
of return on his net business assets at either 20 per cent or 10 per cent. Dividends distributed
by listed companies are always taxed as capital income.
12Proposition 1 For those entrepreneurs who expect that ￿H < ￿L; the split sys-
tem represents a penalty on start-up investment and e⁄ort, magnifying the risk
of failure e⁄ect. However, for those enterprises which turn out to be highly prof-
itable, the split system provides a strong investment incentive in the expansion
stage and mitigates the risk of failure e⁄ect on start-up investment.
As to the e⁄ect of the potential undervaluation upon exit induced by the
tax system, it is clear from (12) how the King (1989) undervaluation ￿ = 1￿￿c
a⁄ects the cost of capital in the expansion stage
FK(K;￿i) =
￿









; i = H;L:
Undervaluation acts as a counterforce to the boost e⁄ect of the split rule
(and magni￿es its penalty) on high (low) pro￿tability enterprises.
4.2 Dual Income Taxation of Corporations
We stay within classical corporate taxation, which regards an incorporated com-
pany and its owners as separate tax entities. We extend our previous work
(Kanniainen et al. (2005) to analyze the Nordic split rules. Let ￿c;￿d;￿g;￿w
denote the tax rates on pro￿ts, dividends, capital gains and earned income.16









(1 + r)2 + ￿g
￿ [F(K;￿)(1 ￿ ￿c) + K] ￿ k
(1 + r)2 (14)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿c)F(K;￿) + K
(1 + r)
2 :
The operating pro￿ts of the ￿rst stage af(e;k;￿) and the second stage F(K;￿)
form the corporation tax base. The entrepreneur￿ s dividend tax base is d =
(1 ￿ ￿c)af(e;k;￿) + k ￿ K at time t = 1. The expansion-stage return is taken
as a capital gain. The enterprise is sold at its net asset value at time t = 2
subject to a possible undervaluation of its assets in respect of their book value:
the after-corporation-tax cash ￿ ow (1 ￿ ￿c)F(K;￿) + K multiplied by their
valuation factor ￿. The entrepreneur￿ s initial investment k quali￿es as a de-
duction from the base of the capital gains tax liability. Thus the last term rep-
resents the cash e⁄ect of the undervaluation to the owners of the ￿rm to be sold.
As to the split rules, Finland and Sweden split the dividend, while Norway
16We consider enterprises with a domestic owner. Hence, the mechanisms of an open econ-
omy in the form of foreign ownership do not arise.
13splits the pre-tax pro￿t with the capital base expressed as follows
B1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿c)af(e;k;￿) + k;
￿ = 1 for Finland;Norway; ￿ = 0 for Sweden
B2 = (1 ￿ ￿c)F(K;￿) + K; Norway
B2 is not needed for Finland and Sweden since no dividend is paid in stage 2.
The signi￿cance of the current Finnish split rule is that the distributed dividend
at time t = 1 is included in the capital base since 1999. It was previously
deducted so that B1 = K held true.17 Only the acquisition cost of shares, k;
quali￿es for the capital base in Sweden.18
The split rules of Finland and Sweden In an incorporated company, the
split of the entrepreneur￿ s total business income into income from capital and
earned income operates somewhat di⁄erently than for an unincorporated com-
pany. The tax authority imputes the income from capital at a presumptive rate
of return, ￿, taxes it, ￿B1, at the dividend tax rate rate ￿d while the remaining
distributed pro￿t, d￿￿B1; is taxed at the rate on earned income, ￿i
w: Then the








[(1 ￿ ￿c)af(e;k;￿) + k ￿ K ￿ ￿B1]
1 + r
: (15)
which replaces the second term (the dividend tax term) in (14).
The split rule of Norway It is not possible to include all the details of
the Norwegian dual income tax. We con￿ne ourselves to a simpli￿ed version.
Norway taxes pro￿ts at a rate ￿c, which is equal to the capital income tax rate
￿p, and thereafter splits pre-tax income into capital income and personal income,
by subtracting the imputed capital income, ￿B1 and ￿B2, from pre-tax pro￿ts.
Personal income is then surtaxed at the rate ￿ws = ￿i
w ￿ ￿c so that, together
with the tax on pro￿ts, personal income is taxed at the rate of earned income,
￿i















or after substitutions for ￿ws and Bi and combining the terms









17Because the earlier results concerning Finland were derived using this narrower capital
base, we will brie￿y comment below its e⁄ect on the expansion-stage cost of capital.
18Another di⁄erence from Finland is that Sweden always splits the realization gain evenly
into earned income and capital income (Lindhe et al. 2004). Therefore, the rate of the capital
gains tax in the fourth term of (14) is in fact ￿g =
￿d+￿w
2 .
19To be more precise, the capital base in Finland is capital minus debt, i.e. net assets of
the ￿rm. In Norway, it is the gross non-￿nancial capital. In our model debt is not considered,







(1 ￿ ￿c)af(e;k;￿i) + k
1 + r
+




which replaces (14) and (15). We have left the undervaluation term out in (16).
For the ￿L-state it is as in (14), but for the ￿H-state, the personal surtax addi-
tionally reduces the net-of-tax value of the sold assets subject to undervaluation.
4.3 Investment Incentives under Nordic DIT
Finland and Sweden The tax-adjusted value of the enterprise is
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￿caf(e;k;￿i) + ￿d￿B1 + ￿i
w
￿

















(1 ￿ ￿c)F(K;￿i) + K
￿
) (17)
For the cost-of capital of the expansion investment, we have
FK(K;￿i) =
(r ￿ b) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
￿
￿i
w(1 + r) ￿ ￿￿g
￿
(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿g)￿
; i = H;L: (18)
which is the same for both Finland and Sweden because K itself is not part
of the capital base B1 in either country. This is also the reason why the split
parameter does not enter (18).
In contrast to the case of ￿d = ￿w, where the e⁄ects of the split system nat-
urally vanish, the dividend split of DIT is seen from (18), however, to reduce
the cost of capital for expansion investment by ￿rms with high expected prof-
itability, ￿H
w ￿ ￿d > 0. Because a marginal euro of dividends is taxed as earned
income in this regime, the opportunity cost of a retained post-tax euro is less
than without the split. That is, the e⁄ect of the early-stage dividend tax avoid-
ance in favour of the later-stage capital gains tax is stronger in the third term
of the numerator in (18).20 For ￿rms expecting low pro￿tability, ￿L
w ￿ ￿d < 0,
the split system clearly discourages expansion in contrast to a proportional rate
structure, ￿d = ￿w or absence of a split system.
The proper double-tax multiplier in (18) is 1
(1￿￿c)(1￿￿g) if there is no under-
valuation of assets at exit, ￿ = 1. But, it is 1
(1￿￿c)(1￿￿d) with the standard "new
20With K forming solely the capital base of the old Finnish rule, a fourth term ￿(￿i
w ￿
￿d)￿(1 + r) would appear in the numerator of (18). This created a second channel on the
cost of capital. Because a marginal investment also contributed to the capital base, B, this





￿ per euro of post-tax ￿rst-stage pro￿t.
15view" undervaluation, ￿ = 1￿￿d
1￿￿g < 1: Utilizing the latter ￿ in (18), we obtain
FK(K;￿i) =
r(1 ￿ ￿i
w) ￿ b ￿ (￿i
w ￿ ￿d)
(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿d)
; i = H;L: (19)
The conclusions about the e⁄ect of the split rule on the cost of capital in the
high and low expected pro￿tability regimes, ￿H and ￿L; are even more clear-cut
from (19) than from (18).
Being a closely-held company in a regime where residual dividends are taxed









; i = H;L
which with b = 0 is pre-tax interest and is not grossed up by the capital gains tax,
though part of our model. Thus the dividend split system is neutral in respect
of expansion investment among closely-held and listed companies both in its
Finnish and Swedish versions. Our result, however, is di⁄erent from Lindhe et
al. (2002), who derived the same for Sweden only. Had they introduced a capital
gains tax into their model, their steady-state cost of capital would have been the
standard "new view" one FK(K;￿i) = r
(1￿￿g)(1￿￿c) which is higher than ours.21
In our model, undervaluation produces the result that the marginal expansion-
stage investment is taxed once only, though we are explicitly in the framework
of double taxation.






1 ￿ ￿i + r + ￿i
w(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿d ￿ ￿g=(1 + r)




Assume that ￿H > ￿L with ￿H
w ￿￿p > 0 is expected. Then Sweden di⁄ers from










(1 ￿ ￿c)(1 ￿ ￿i
w + ￿(￿i
w ￿ ￿d))
because Sweden allows for neither distributed nor reinvested pro￿ts in its capital
base. We observe from (20), ￿rst, that the taxation of residual dividends as
earned income implies a higher double-tax multiplier in (20) than under a ￿ at
tax on capital income and, therefore, discourages start-up investment. Second,
the split system directly raises the initial cost of capital via its numerator in
(20) under such an expectation when ￿i￿i
w(1￿￿)+￿￿d > ￿g=(1+r) holds true
for the tax rate on residual dividends. This new result is more speci￿c about the
21Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2002) used the old capital base of Finland, B1 = K.
Therefore their steady-state cost of capital for expansion investment is less than the standard




w ) , the e⁄ect of the capital base "padding".
16depressing e⁄ect of earned income dividends on the start-up cost of capital than
in Kari (1999) or Lindhe et al. (2002). The reason why this di⁄ers from the
earlier results is that we have two consecutive investment opportunities while
the earlier papers focused on utilizing a given set of investment opportunities
optimally at each time instant. Notice that the degree of undervaluation at exit
does not enter (20) as in Sinn (1991a, b).















The Finnish split system interacts with the e⁄ort decision via the double-tax
multiplier which, in contrast to a progressive personal income tax or absence
of DIT, is higher (lower) under low (high) expected pro￿tability, discouraging
(encouraging) e⁄ort provision, while in Sweden the latter part of this e⁄ect is
missing.
Norway We consider only the case of no undervaluation of sold assets, ￿ = 1.
The ￿rst-order condition for the optimal expansion-stage investment is
FK(K;￿i) =
(r ￿ b) ￿ (￿i
w ￿ ￿c)￿
(1 ￿ ￿i
w + (1 ￿ ￿c)￿(￿i
w ￿ ￿c))
; i = H;L
which is clearly a⁄ected by the DIT split rule. The relevant cases are ￿H
w > ￿c
and ￿L
w = ￿c because there is no income left subject to the surtax. In contrast
to (9) of a JS tax, the split rule o⁄ers an enormous incentive for expansion-stage
investment if the realization of total business income settles in the income band
where the entrepreneur faces a tax rate ￿H
w > ￿c. But, if his business generates
relatively little total income so that nothing is surtaxed and ￿L
w = ￿c holds,22
DIT has no e⁄ect on his expansion-stage capital. Also, notice that the Norwe-
gian system taxes business income only once, the reference tax multiplier being
that of earned income, which is mitigated by the split rule if high pro￿tability
is expected.









1 ￿ ￿i + r ￿ (￿i
w ￿ ￿c)￿
1 ￿ ￿i
w + (1 ￿ ￿c)￿(￿i
w ￿ ￿c)
with similar implications for the expected high and low realizations of ￿ and
for the consequent ￿i
w in respect of ￿c as in the case of the cost of capital for
expansion investment.










w + (1 ￿ ￿c)￿(￿i
w ￿ ￿c)
;
22In Norway an entrepreneur as well as an employer receives deductions and allowances only
against the "￿at tax" section ￿w = ￿c of the rate schedule.
17in the expected high pro￿tability regime via the mitigated tax multiplier.
Above we have not explicitly taken into account the e⁄ect of the potential
tax system induced undervaluation upon exit23. Its general pattern on the
expansion cost of capital follows the principle in (12), but the counterforce
created by undervaluation is magni￿ed by the split system in the ￿H-state.
Cross-Country Comparison As regards expansion investment, the three
Nordic DIT systems studied show a rather similar qualitative e⁄ect both un-
der high and low expected pro￿tability. Though Finland and Sweden seem to
represent two opposing extremes in their approach to the capital base, both
schemes produce the same cost of capital for expansion investment and treat
identically investments by closely and widely held companies. Norway also splits
the expansion-stage pro￿t and, therefore, dividend and capital gains taxes do
not have separate roles with expansion investment which is an essential general
feature (cf. Kanniainen et al. 2005), maintained in the Finnish and Swedish
DIT split rules, if there is no tax system induced undervaluation of the sold
company at exit.
But as regards initial investment, the system of Norway is the most benign
under our modeling because it does not tax the distribution of the freed funds, k,
as a dividend as Finland and Sweden do, i.e. it taxes business income only once.
Neither does it create those detrimental incentives on entrepreneurs, expecting
to be of the low pro￿tability type, which are prevalent in the tax system of
Finland. As noted above, the e⁄ective rate of the capital gains tax in the
Swedish DIT depends on the tax rate on earned income which, in contrast to
Finland, penalizes both the initial and expansion investments. Because Sweden
does not allow the presumptive income from capital to be determined on the
basis of reinvested pro￿ts, the Swedish DIT also leads to higher tax multipliers
than the Finnish and Norwegian regimes and, therefore, potentially to the most
detrimental incentives for e⁄ort and initial investment.
5 Career Choice: Entrepreneur or Laborer?
It is a property of the Johansson-Samuelson tax with full loss o⁄sets that the
tax structure is neutral in respect of the choice between the outside option and a
sole proprietor (an unincorporated enterprise). It need not be neutral in respect
of the formation of incorporated companies. For this reason, we examine the
entry threshold for incorporated enterprises in general and, thereafter, within
the Nordic DIT. It is often thought that the current tax laws, say in the Nordic
countries for example, favor the establishment of new enterprises in incorporated
form rather than in the form of sole proprietor.
23Remember, however, that the company need not be undervalued when sold because the
prospective buyers in the corporate sector bid with pre-tax euros, as shown by Kanniainen et
al. (2005).
18When incorporated, the entrepreneur maximizes






where the notation with the super index ￿ denotes the variables under taxation.
Consider ￿rst the entrepreneurial choices under a uniform structure of tax rates,
￿c = ￿d = ￿g = ￿w: In the classical tax system, owing to the double taxation
of corporate income, the after-tax enterprise value is lower than the present
value of the after-tax outside option with identical cash ￿ ows. Though this
mechanism is implicitly discussed in the tax literature (Harberger (1962)), it
largely abstracts from the question of occupational choice. We therefore report
it as a proposition. To complete the description of the tax structure for this
proposition, we introduce explicitly the interest tax rate, ￿p; to study taxation
with uniform tax rates.24 We denote the before-tax interest rate by b r, i.e.
r = (1 ￿ ￿p)b r:
Proposition 2 Let a￿ denote the marginal entrepreneurial talent under tax-
ation. Then it follows that under a tax structure with uniform tax rates, i.e.
￿ = ￿c = ￿d = ￿g = ￿w = ￿p; there is a positive relationship between the tax rate
and the marginal talent, @a￿=@￿ > 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above theorem holds strictly for a tax structure which does not distort
the e⁄ort choice e￿ and investments k￿;K￿: However, we expect it to hold more
generally. We therefore prove
Proposition 3 Let am and a￿ denote the marginal entrepreneurial talents in
the absence of taxation and under taxation, respectively. Then it follows that
under a tax structure with uniform tax rates, i.e. ￿ = ￿c = ￿d = ￿g = ￿w = ￿p,
there is a linear dependence between the marginal entrepreneurial talents
a￿ = ￿o + ￿1am;
where ￿1 is a strictly positive constant and greater than one.
Proof. See Appendix B.
What our proposition suggests is that even a uniform tax structure ￿c =
￿d = ￿g = ￿w is distortive in respect of enterprise formation. With identical
cash ￿ ows, the after-tax enterprise value would be lower in the classical tax
system than the present value of the after-tax outside option. The dividend tax
is distortionary and a⁄ects the career choice of individuals between entrepre-
neurship and entering the labor force. The non-neutrality of dividend taxation
follows from the observation that double taxation of pro￿ts reduces the ex ante
value of the yet unborn enterprise relative to the after-tax value of the outside
24The ￿rst of the two propositions below holds for neutral tax systems, the second holds
for uniform tax systems.
19option. For the equality V ￿
o (am) = w(1￿￿w) to hold, am must be greater with
a uniform tax structure than in the absence of taxation, i.e. the new business
idea must show greater pro￿tability, cf. King (1989).
With a non-uniform tax structure, an additional distortion is created by
the undervaluation at exit. Dividend taxation may thus have larger distortions
on enterprise formation than has been previously recognized by the literature
emphasizing its capitalization. This mechanism is seldom analyzed in the lit-
erature focusing on the neutrality of dividend taxation in respect of expansion
investments by mature companies. The exceptions are King (1989), Keuschnigg
(2001) and Dietz (2003).
We next examine the e⁄ects of Nordic dual model on entrepreneurship. Take
the Finnish case (17) for the tax-adjusted value of the enterprise. We prove the
following proposition, which also holds for the Swedish and Norwegian model
Proposition 4 The Nordic dual model encourages the establishment of new
enterprises by entrepreneurs who expect to be of the high-pro￿tability type. It
discourages the establishment of new enterprises by entrepreneurs who expect to
be of the low-pro￿tability type.
Proof. Take (17). Introduce ￿ = 1 (as ￿ does not play a role in what
follows). Introduce it into the indi⁄erence condition (26), Y = V ￿
o (a￿) ￿ w(1 ￿

















w ￿ ￿d)￿](1 ￿ ￿c)f(e;k;￿i) > 0:
Therefore, da￿=d￿ < 0; when ￿￿i(￿i
w ￿ ￿d) > 0 and da￿=d￿ > 0; when
￿￿i(￿i
w ￿ ￿d) < 0:25
6 Concluding Discussion
In comprehensive (global) income taxation, a taxpayer￿ s entire economic income
is subject to a single progressive tax schedule. Dual income taxation (DIT)
makes a distinction between income from capital and earned income. DIT was
adopted by the Nordic countries to improve savings incentives, limit tax arbi-
trage and reduce distortions caused by the non-uniform treatment of di⁄erent
kinds of capital income. A further goal of the system was to adjust the Nordic
25To clarify the mechanism, we notice that with given tax rates, ￿H
w ;￿L
w;￿d; an increase in
the presumptive rate ￿ reduces the average tax rate of high-pro￿table enterprises, creating
the incentive suggested by our proposition.
20tax systems to a world of increasing mobility of capital. The aim of the rules
for closely-held companies and sole proprietors is, on the one hand, to prevent
the entrepreneurs from shifting their labor income to the sphere of income from
capital and, on the other hand, to continue taxing the former subject to a pro-
gressive rate schedule and the latter at uniform proportional rates in response
to international mobility of capital and to prevent tax arbitrage among di⁄erent
categories of income from capital.
We have emphasized the need to incorporate the neglected observation, the
di⁄erential treatment of low and high pro￿tabilty enterprises in DIT, into the
theory of enterprise taxation. The rules may in fact raise the tax burden of low-
pro￿tability small enterprises because their owners, by dividing business income
among family members, for example, would bene￿t from low marginal tax rates
in the beginning of a progressive rate schedule. These entrepreneurs face a higher
cost of capital for start-up and expansion investments and a higher tax cost on
e⁄ort provision than without the DIT rules.26 But, the opposite incentives
are o⁄ered to high-pro￿tability enterprises. Their distributed pro￿ts would be
taxed residually as earned income at a higher rate than the tax rate on capital
income. By refraining from distributing such residual dividends and instead by
investing and expanding their asset base, the basis of imputed future capital
income, the entrepreneurs can smooth their tax payments. Whether the DIT
rules o⁄er a subsidy to investment27 depends, ￿rst, on the detailed de￿nition
of the capital base, the allowed assets and the instant of their measurement,
and second, on the tax system caused undervaluation of the enterprise assets at
the entrepreneur￿ s exit, when she sells her enterprise via a trade sale or a stock
exchange listing.28 If there is no undervaluation of assets at exit, as held by the
"old view" of corporate taxation, the DIT rules de￿nitely boost investment in
high-pro￿tability enterprises.
As regards a comprehensive income tax with full o⁄setting of losses, which
is neutral in respect of the career choice between being an entrepreneur or a
laborer, we show that a tax rate increase in a system with a uniform rate
structure over all kinds of income increases the ability threshold of individuals
who choose entrepreneurship.
With such a rate structure, the e⁄ects of the DIT rules themselves vanish by
de￿nition. A general tax rate cut within uniform tax rates thus induces a larger
proportion of individuals to choose entrepreneurship. But, with non-uniform
personal tax rates, the Nordic DIT, with its embedded split rule, tends to lower
(raise) the ability threshold of entrepreneurs who expect high (low) pro￿tability
from their enterprises. Therefore, we conclude that the Nordic DIT system
enhances entrepreneurship where high pro￿tability is expected.
26Norway, however, is an example of an ingenious system that avoids these detrimental
e⁄ects on entrepreneurs.
27In some cases even employment is subsidized because the DIT rules allow part of the
annual wage bill to be added to the capital base.
28The DIT rules prevent the entrepreneur from avoiding the high marginal tax rate on earned
income at exit by either double-taxing undistributed pro￿ts (Finland), taxing only windfall
capital gains (Norway) or by applying the split rule to realized capital gains (Sweden).
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7 Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
We prove the result formally in the case where the tax structure is constructed
in an ingenious way in that it is neutral in respect of e⁄ort choice e￿ and in-
vestments k￿;K￿:29 Consider the indi⁄erence condition for occupational choice
under taxation,
V ￿
o (a￿) = w(1 ￿ ￿w); (22)
29We thus assume that there is perfect loss-o⁄set even for a start-up ￿rm. Disallowing for
perfect loss-o⁄set would make our proposition hold for a further reason.
24or
￿ (c(e￿) + k￿) + ￿
1
1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p)




1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p)
+ ￿d
(1 ￿ ￿c)a￿f(e￿;k￿) + k￿ ￿ K￿
1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p)
+ ￿c
F(K￿)
(1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p))2 + ￿g
(￿F(K￿)(1 ￿ ￿c) + K￿) ￿ k￿
(1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p))2
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿c)F(K￿) + K￿
(1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p))
2 ] ￿ w(￿p)(1 ￿ ￿w) = 0:
The occupational choice condition (13) is an identity. We insert a uniform
tax structure and derive the impact of an increase in the tax rate on the ability
of the marginal entrepreneur. There will be three mechanisms to be considered.
First, a marginal increase in tax rates reduces the after-tax cash ￿ ows to the
enterprise in both production periods. This tends to raise the entrepreneurial
threshold. However, there is an o⁄setting e⁄ect to the extent that the discount
rate increases. This e⁄ect will tend to push up the discounted value of the
after-tax cash ￿ ows, though they are reduced in size. Third, increased tax on
interest income raises the present value of wages in labor contracts. This is also
bad news for entrepreneurship because it tends to push up the entrepreneurial
threshold as labor market prospects are more attractive than they used to be.
The present value of labor income, written explicitly, is
w(￿p) = wo[
1









1 (b) = ￿K +
F(K￿) + (1 + b)K￿
1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p)
:
Inserting, we obtain
￿ (c(e￿) + k￿)+
￿
1
1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p)
[(1 ￿ ￿d)(1 ￿ ￿c)af(e￿;k￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿d)K￿ + (1 ￿ ￿d)k￿]+
￿(
1
1 + b r(1 ￿ ￿p)
)2[(1 ￿ ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿c)F(K￿) + (1 ￿ ￿g)K￿ + bK￿ + ￿gk￿]
= (1 ￿ ￿w)w(￿p):
Totally di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ and a￿; we can show that the entrepre-





(1 ￿ ￿)(2 + r)f(e￿;k￿)
[




￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿
2((1 ￿ ￿)r + b)K￿ + 2(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r)k￿
(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 + r):
]
This expression is complex. To build an intuition, the entrepreneurial thresh-
old is distorted by taxation even at uniform rates, basically because entrepre-
neurial income is subject to double taxation in an incorporated enterprise. This
is the e⁄ect hinted at by King (1989). The ability threshold of the marginal
entrepreneur is increased if da
￿
d￿ > 0: The expression for da
￿
d￿ can be grouped into
two positive terms and one negative term. Recall that the opportunity cost r
can be thought of as a compound return over a number of years and the oper-
ating cash ￿ ows are similarly accumulated returns over each stage. Therefore,
the positive terms outweigh the negative term.
8 Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3.
In the absence of taxation, the marginal entrepreneur am is identi￿ed from the
condition￿(c(e) + k) + ￿ 1
1+r[amf(e;k) + k + V ￿
1 (b)] = w:
Inserting into the indi⁄erence condition under taxation; and recalling that
V ￿
1 (b) = ￿K +
F(K)+(1+b)K
1+r(1￿￿) ; we ￿nd that there is a linear dependence between
the marginal abilities
a￿ = ￿o + ￿1am:
Its parameters are given by
￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿w)

















Z = (c(e￿) + k￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿w)(c(e) + k)
+ ￿
1
1 + r(1 ￿ ￿)
[(1 ￿ ￿w)V ￿




1 + r(1 ￿ ￿)
[(1 ￿ ￿w)(k ￿ (1 + ￿g)k￿)]
+ ￿[￿d
￿K￿
1 + r(1 ￿ ￿)
+ ￿c
F(K￿)
(1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))2
+ ￿g
(￿F(K￿)(1 ￿ ￿c) + K￿)
(1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿c)F(K￿) + K￿
(1 + r(1 ￿ ￿))
2 ]
We know that under distortive taxes, e￿ < e; k￿ < k; and that K￿ < K: Thus,
f(e;k)
f(e￿;k￿) > 1: With a uniform tax rate,
(1￿￿w)
(1￿￿c)(1￿￿d) > 1: Therefore, ￿1 >> 1:
Moreover, the greater the dividend and the corporate tax rates, the greater the
coe¢ cient ￿1: This tends to make a￿ > am: There are both positive and negative
terms in Z; yet
w(￿)￿w
1￿￿w is de￿nitively positive. The fact that ￿1 >> 1 makes us
think that there is no reason to doubt that there is positive dependence between
a￿ and am. Note that in fact ￿o ￿ 0 is not needed for a￿ > am:
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